Referensi Jurnal & Buku Politik

Comparative Political Studies, Volume 45, Number 8 August 2012

The Rise of Leftist– Populist Governance in Latin America: The Roots of Electoral Change
Karen L. Remmer (pp. 947-972)
Over the past decade the contours of political party competition in Latin America have been dramatically altered by an upsurge of support for leftist–populist parties and the related weakening of established parties on the center and right end of the political spectrum. Drawing on both
aggregate and individual-level evidence, this article explores the roots of this swing of the political pendulum. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, which attributes the rising “pink tide” to citizen dissatisfaction with market-oriented policies, economic performance, and/or social inequality, the analysis focuses on the role played by improving external economic conditions during the early 2000s, which relaxed the preexisting constraints on policy choice, enhanced the credibility of anti–status quo political actors, and created new opportunities for the pursuit of statist, nationalist, and redistributive political projects and associated challenges to U.S. hegemony. Consistent with this line of theoretical argument, the macro-level evidence indicates that the odds of electing a leftist-populist president in the region rose with improvements in the terms of trade. At the micro level, survey data also show that support for leftist–populist presidents in the region has been positively associated with citizen satisfaction with democracy and the state of the economy as well as with anti- Americanism. The results underline the potential significance of economic fluctuations for understanding electoral dynamics and party system change, particularly under conditions in which government policy choice is constrained by the operation of international markets.
If You’re Against Them You’re With Us: The Effect of Expropriation on
Autocratic Survival
Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo (pp. 973-1003)
This article advances a theory of why some dictators weaken the elite through expropriation whereas
others do not. When the organization that launches a new dictator into power is uncertain about
whether he will remain loyal to them, a dictator’s decision to expropriate the preexisting elite may
contribute to political stability by signaling his exclusive reliance on this group. The authors
corroborate this claim empirically. Using new data compiled on land, resource, and bank
expropriations in Latin America from 1950 to 2002, the authors show that large-scale expropriation
helps dictators survive in power. Furthermore, expropriation tends to occur early in a dictator’s
tenure, and its effect on leader survival decays over time, providing additional evidence for its
signaling value. The history of autocracy in Mexico between 1911 and 2000 further illustrates the
importance of expropriation in promoting autocratic survival as well as how the codification of new
property rights can transform a dictator’s launching organization into a new economic elite.
Fiscal Policy and the Firm: Do Low Corporate Tax Rates Attract Multinational
Nathan M. Jensen (pp. 1004-1026)
The existing literature on the political economy of taxation explores how the mobility of firms affects
the ability of governments to tax capital. In this article the author tests the relationship between
corporate tax rates and multinational investment decisions in advanced, industrialized economies.
He utilizes a time-series cross-sectional general error correction model to explore the impact of
corporate taxation rates and foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows in up to 19 Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development economies from 1980 to 2000. To mitigate potential
endogeneity problems, the author’s identification strategy takes advantage of delays between the
passage of tax reductions and the implementation of these policies. The author finds no relationship
between corporate tax rates and flows of foreign direct investment. This finding has implications on
the link between globalization and domestic politics.
Legislative Institutions and Corruption in Developing Country Democracies
Vineeta Yadav (pp. 1027-1058)
This article extends the research on institutional sources of corruption by investigating whether
legislative institutions play a significant role in driving corruption in developing country democracies.
The author argues that when legislative rules (a) give parties control over agenda setting and (b)
allow parties to strip legislators who vote against the party line of their legislative mandates, parties
can exercise valuable influence over the legislative policy process, which allows them to engage in
practices leading to higher corruption. The author derives two testable hypotheses linking higher
party influence over agenda setting and voting in the legislature to higher corruption and test them
by using a new data set on legislative rules for 64 developing country democracies from 1984 to
2004. The empirical results corroborate the hypotheses and remain robust when controlling for
alternative explanations, employing different estimation techniques, and using different measures of